

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

TOP SECRET

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Action
SS

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Info

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 534, NOVEMBER 5, 8 PM

NIAC

EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY

POLICY

REF: CIRCULAR 843

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDO/MB

REVIEWED by

DATE 5/19/88

() RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
() EXCISE () DECLASSIFY in PART
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FOI, EO or PA exemptions

TS authority to:

() CLASSIFY as _____, OADR
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADR

CIRCULAR 843 IS A CLEAR AND POWERFUL PRESENTATION OF US POSITION. AT THIS CRITICAL MOMENT, WHEN OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES ARE AT MERCY OF INCOMPLETE AND OFTEN MISLEADING NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS OF DEVELOPMENTS, AWARENESS THAT US IS PROCEEDING AS SET FORTH IN REFTEL WOULD CLARIFY SITUATION AND REASSURE THEM. IT WOULD ALSO ASSURE INSOFAR AS WE CAN THAT REST OF ALLIANCE SPEAKS WITH SAME VOICE WE DO AND THAT EFFECT OF US FIRMNESS WILL NOT BE WEAKENED BY FAILURE OF ALLIANCE TO UNDERSTAND AND SUPPORT NEED FOR FIRMNESS. I BELIEVE IT IS IMPERATIVE IF WE ARE TO MAINTAIN PRESENT SATISFACTORY ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY THAT I BE AUTHORIZED STATE TO NAC AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BASIC LINES OUR PRESENT ASSESSMENT CUBAN SITUATION AND POLICY WE ARE PURSUING. THIS COULD BE READILY AND EFFECTIVELY DONE WITHOUT PRESENTING DETAILS WHICH WOULD GIVE AWAY US TACTICS BY CONFINING PRESENTATION TO FOLLOWING POINTS DRAWN FROM REFTEL:

1. WE HAVE GOOD EVIDENCE RUSSIANS DISMANTLING MISSILE BASES, BUT WE DO NOT HAVE DECISIVE EVIDENCE WHAT THEY ARE DOING WITH EQUIPMENT OR WHAT FUTURE OF SAM RPT SAM SITES WILL BE. ASSEMBLY 1L-28S CONTINUES AND THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE OF INTENT ESTABLISH SUBMARINE TENDING FACILITY. US AERIAL SURVEILLANCE PROCEEDS WITHOUT GUARANTEE OF SAFETY.

2. WE

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2. WE WANT THE REMOVAL OF ALL OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND SOVIET MILITARY BASE IN CUBA, AND THAT IS HOW WE UNDERSTAND AGREEMENTS OF OCT 27 AND 28 BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND KHRUSHCHEV.
3. EVENTS IN NEXT FEW WEEKS LIKELY MOVE IN ONE OF TWO MAJOR DIRECTIONS. ON ONE HAND WE MAY BE ABLE TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WILL IN FACT INSURE VERIFIED REMOVAL ALL OFFENSIVE WEAPONS SYSTEMS FROM CUBA AND ESTABLISH RELIABLE SAFEGUARDS AGAINST THEIR REINTRODUCTION. THIS MEANS REMOVAL ALL OFFENSIVE MISSILES AND SUPPORTING EQUIPMENT AND ALL BOMBERS AND THEIR EQUIPMENT, SUBMARINE BASE EQUALLY UNACCEPTABLE. IT MEANS NOT ONLY AERIAL SURVEILLANCE AND POST-REMOVAL GROUND INSPECTIONS FOR DEPARTING OFFENSIVE WEAPONS BUT ALSO VERIFICATION OF ACTUAL RE-EXPORT OF MISSILES, PERHAPS BY COUNTING THEM ON DEPARTING SHIPS.
4. ON OTHER HAND, WE MAY BE FACED WITH SOVIET TACTICS FAMILIAR IN PAST NEGOTIATIONS. BARGAINS MAY BE FUDGED, SECRECY MAY PREVENT VERIFICATION, AGREEMENTS MAY BE REINTERPRETED, BY ONE MEANS OR ANOTHER SOVIET GOVERNMENT MAY SEEK TO SUSTAIN AND ADVANCE VERY POLICY IT HAS PROFESSED TO GIVE UP. THERE IS MUCH EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT CONCLUSION THAT THIS IS WHAT IS NOW BEGINNING.
5. IF FIRST COURSE OF EVENTS IS THAT FOLLOWED BY SOVIETS, US WILL HOLD TO ITS CLEAR UNDERTAKING TO REMOVE PROMPTLY QUARANTINE MEASURES IN EFFECT AND TO GIVE ASSURANCES AGAINST INVASION OF CUBA. LATTER COMMITMENT WOULD OF COURSE IN NO WAY DEROGATE FROM OUR HEMISPHERIC OBLIGATIONS TO DEAL WITH AGGRESSIVE OR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES BY PRESENT CUBAN REGIME.
6. SECOND LINE SOVIET CONDUCT IS UNACCEPTABLE TO US. WITHOUT ADEQUATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR VERIFICATION AND INSPECTION BOTH THAT OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ARE REMOVED AND THAT NO MORE ARE INTRODUCED, BOTH SURVEILLANCE AND QUARANTINE MUST BE CONTINUED AND BOTH MAY NEED BE EXTENDED. ALL OFFENSIVE WEAPONS SYSTEMS MUST BE REMOVED, OR WE SHALL HAVE TO CONSIDER FURTHER ACTION OF OUR OWN TO REMOVE THEM. THERE CANNOT BE ATMOSPHERE OF AMBIGUITY OR UNCERTAINTY, NOW OR IN FUTURE, REGARDING PRESENCE IN CUBA OF SOVIET MILITARY BASE OF

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OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. EVENTS OF LAST THREE WEEKS MAKE VERIFICATION ESSENTIAL, AND SOVIET ASSURANCES OR GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT CAN NOT BE ACCEPTED.

7. TO PREVENT UNACCEPTABLE SECOND COURSE, US WILL MAKE IT CLEAR THROUGHOUT, WE TRUST WITH UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT OF OUR ALLIES, THAT WE REQUIRE FULL AND VERIFIED CARRYING OUT OF SOVIET AGREEMENTS. SOVIET GOVERNMENT MUST UNDERSTAND IT HAS CLEAR CHOICE BETWEEN VERIFIED REMOVAL OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND RENEWED ACTION BY US. IT HAS NO MIDDLE CHOICE, AND ITS OWN INTERESTS SHOULD LEAD IT TO EXECUTE KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV AGREEMENTS HONESTLY AND FULLY AND SEE TO IT THAT CASTRO COOPERATES.

REQUEST AUTHORIZATION MAKE ABOVE PRESENTATION IN NAC "TEA PARTY" PRIVATE SESSION NOT LATER THAN NOVEMBER 7 1 AM CONFIDENT IT WOULD SERVE US INTERESTS BY GIVING OUR ALLIES FIRM POLICY BASE FROM WHICH THEY CAN SUPPORT US IN DIFFICULT PERIOD OF COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS. WOULD ALSO DO MUCH TO WARD OFF GROWTH ANY SPIRIT OF DETENTE OR EUPHORIA WHICH MIGHT TEMPT ALLIES TO SEE US RATHER THAN SOVIETS AS OBSTACLES TO SETTLEMENT.

FINLETTER

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